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The late John Chipman Gray begins the chapter on Charitable Trusts
in his well known book on Perpetuities by observing that:
"it is commonly said that gifts to charities are not subject to the Rule
against Perpetuities. This may be to a certain extent correct, but the
subject is involved in considerable confusion owing to the ambiguity
of the terms employed."'
In this article I propose to discuss some of the English cases, which
illustrate this confusion. Although a trust for charitable purposes
may last forever, the gift should, according to English law, vest within
the period fixed by the rule in Cadell v. Palmer.2 Lord Selborne3 states
this principle in the following words:
"If the gift in trust for charity is itself conditional upon a future and
uncertain event, it is subject, in our judgment, to the same rules and
principles as any other estate depending for its coming into existence
upon a condition precedent. If the condition is never fulfilled, the
estate never arises; if it is so remote and indefinite as to transgress the
limits of time prescribed by the rules of law against perpetuities,
the gift fails ab initio."
The principle, as thus stated, seems clear and has frequently been
applied. Thus in Re Lord Stratheden and CampbelP the testator
bequeathed an annuity to be provided to the Central London Rangers
on the appointment of the next lieutenant-colonel. Romer, J. said:
"It is a gift conditional on the appointment of the next lieutengnt-
colonel. Now, the next lieutenant-colonel may not be appointed for
some time after the death of the present commanding officer; he
never may be appointed at all; and consequently, it appears to me that
this is a gift conditional upon an event which transgresses the limit of
time prescribed by the rules of law against perpetuities."
This principle, however, does not, at any rate at first sight, appear
to have been applied in several reported cases, so that it is necessary
to consider whether the cases can, in some way, be reconciled with it,
or, if not, whether there is some exception. There is a passage in
'Gray, The Rile Against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) sec. 589.
' (1833, H. L.) i Cl. & F. 372.
'Chamberlayne v. Brockett (1872) 8 Ch. 2o6, 211.
" [1894] 3 Ch. 265.
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Lord Macnaghten's judgment in Wallis v. Solicitor General for New
Zealand" in which, quoting Tudor's Charitable Trusts, he says:
"Where there is an immediate gift for Charitable purposes, the gift
is not rendered invalid by the fact that the particular application
directed cannot immediately take effect, or will not of necessity take
effect within any definite limit of time, and may never take effect at
all ."
This statement is often quoted, but what does it mean? Does "imme-
diate" mean that the gift is not subject to a condition precedent or that
there is no prior gift to some person? Again, is Lord Macnaghten's
statement limited to those cases where there is a general charitable
intention so that if the particular application fails the money can be
applied cy pres or does it extend to cases where the only charitable
intention is for the particular purpose so that the doctrine of cy pres
is not applicable; and if it does so extend how can it be reconciled
with Lord Selborne's principle stated above? Mr. Tyssen's view is
that the cases establish an exception to Lord Selborne's principle.
He says :'
"We have already noticed many cases of bequests for the establish-
ment of new charitable institutions, where the testator's object. could
not be carried out by his own trustees alone, but some act was
required to be done by some other person, such as a gift of land
as a site for the institution. In such cases if no limit is fixed
to the time within which all necessary conditions precedent must
be fulfilled, an objection may be raised that the gift is not limited
so as necessarily to take effect within the period defined by the rule
of remoteness. On considering the cases, however, we find that the
Court has not subjected such cases to this rule, but has adopted a
very elastic principle, namely, that all conditions must be fulfilled
within a reasonable time."
But can this "elastic principle" be fairly deduced from the cases?
On the other hand we find Mr. Gray saying:i
"If the Court, however, can see an intention to make an unconditional
gift to charity (and the Court is very keen-sighted to discover this
intention) then the gift will be regarded as immediate, not subject to
any condition precedent, and therefore not within the scope of the
Rule against Perpetuities. The mode pointed out by the testator is
only one way, though the preferable way, of carrying out the charitable
purpose; and if it cannot, with regard to the charitable intention,
be carried out in that way, it will be carried out cy pres. Thus while
the Court will allow the fund to be transferred to a corporation not
in existence at the time of the gift, if such corporation is constituted
in a reasonable time, it will not recognize the right of such non-existent
' (P. C.) [9o3] A. C. 173, 186.
'Tyssen, Charitable Bequests (1888) 423.
'Gray, op. cit., secs. 6o7, 6o8.
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corporation to keep the fund locked up until such time as it may
please itself to be incorporated. The formation of the corporation
is not a condition precedent to the charitable trust, and therefore the
trust is not too remote. The cases where charitable gifts to non-
existent corporations or societies have been sustained are numerous.
This mode of treating charitable gifts to bodies hereafter to be incor-
porated as present valid gifts depends upon the doctrine of cy pres."
But again we may ask do the English cases support Mr. Gray's
views? In Attorney-General v. Downings there was a gift to a college
to be established. Wilmot, C. J. said that the gift was not too remote
because the King's License might be obtained in six months, which
was greatly within the time allowed by the law for the expecting
executory trusts to arise. The matter again came before the Court
in Attorney-General v. BowyerO in which it was decided that the heir
was not entitled to the intermediate rents until the college was incor-
porated; so that the cy pres doctrine was applied to these rents.
This case certainly supports the view of Mr. Gray. The leading
case, however, is Attorney-General v. Chester."0
In that case Archbishop Secker gave among other charitable legacies
hI,ooo three per cent bank annuities to his trustees for the purpose
of establishing a bishop in his Majesty's dominions in America and
ordered that if any charity to which he had given a legacy should
no longer subsist, such legacy should fall into the residue. At his
death there was no bishop in America nor any likelihood of there
ever being one. It was argued that the legacy was void and fell into
the residue, but Lord Thurlow, C. said "the money must remain in
Court till it shall be seen whether any such appointment shall take
place."
This is the whole of the judgment as reported in relation to the
legacy. The point of remoteness does not seem to have been raised,
nor was it suggested that the money could be applied cy pres if a
bishopric in America was not founded. Ultimately upon the appoint-
ment of a bishop of Canada the legacy was applied."
In Henshaw v. Atkinson2 the testator bequeathed money for a
Blue Coat School and a Blind Asylum, adding
"but I direct that the said Monies shall not be applied in the purchase
of Lands or the erection of Buildings, it being my expectation that
the Persons will, at their expense, purchase Lands and Buildings for
those purposes."
S (1766, Eng. Ch.) Ambl. 550.
' (1798, Eng. Ch.) 3 Ves. 714.
" (1785, Eng. Ch.) i Bro. C. C. 389.
' See Attorney-General v. The Ironmongers' Company (1833, Eng. Ch.) 2
My. & K. 576, 579.
1 (1818, Eng. Ch.) .3 Madd. 3o6.
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Referring to this direction Sir J. Leach, V. C. said:
"It is next argued, that it was this Testator's intention that the
Charities were not to take effect until Lands or Buildings were sup-
plied by others, and that the Money may be locked up for an indefinite
period of time, and therefore, that the Bequest cannot be sustained.
The Cases of Downing College and the Attorney-General v. Bishop
of Chester, seem to be Authorities against that objection; but the
point does not arise here."
It did not arise because of certain provisions in a second codicil.
In Attorney-General v. Master and Fellows of Catherine Hall, Cam-
bridge13 the testatrix directed her trustees to convey certain real
estate and her personal estate to the college for certain purposes,
when a site of ground had been purchased or procured for the reception
of six fellows and ten scholars in the college. The point that the
devise and bequest were upon the happening of an event which might
be too remote does not seem to have been raised. The testatrix
died in 1745, and the estates were not conveyed until 1767 pursuant
to a decree of 1752.
In Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company 4 an inquiry was ordered
to ascertain whether a bequest for a college in Oude could be given
effect to. Lord Brougham said:
"The case of Attorney-General v. Bishop of Chester furnishes a direct
authority for not declaring a legacy void because it was for an object
which could not at the time be accomplished, and for retaining the
fund in Court until it should be possible to apply it. No doubt if,
in that case, some years had elapsed, and no prospect appeared of an
Episcopal establishment in Canada, the Court would then have declared
the legacy void, and distributed the fund to the parties entitled. So
here, if it shall be found that there can be no application of the fund
in the manner directed by the will, or that the trustees, after making
the attempt, fail in it, the Court will then direct the same application
to be made of it, which they should have done had the bequest been
at first declared void."
In Girdlestone v. Creed15 there was a bequest of residue for building
and endowing a church at Stow Bridge; and when in further pro-
ceedings1 the Attorney-General claimed the residue for the purpose
to the extent of 65oo17 a sum of consols equal thereto was directed
to an account intituled "the contingent account for building and endow-
ing a Church at Stow Bridge" and an inquiry was directed whether
there were any means of applying the fund in or towards the building
"(1820, Eng. Ch.) Jac. 381.
( 836) I Moore P. C. 175. 295.
15 (1849, Eng. Ch.) 8 Hare, 208.
(1853, Eng. Ch.) io Hare, 465, 473.
See 9 Geo. II, ch. 36; 43 Geo. III; ch. lo8.
4
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or endowing of a church at the same place. The question of remote-
ness was not raised.
In Philpott v. George's Hospita' 8 Lord Cranworth, C. refers to
Attorney-General v. Chester apparently with approval but says "the
grounds of that decision it is not necessary for me to go into."
In Sinnett v. Herbertx° the testatrix gave the residue of her personal
estate to trustees to be by them applied in aid of erecting or endowing
an additional church at A. The question, "Can the trust be executed
cy pres if no opportunity appears within any reasonable time for
applying the fund as directed by the testatrix ?" was discussed by Lord
Hatherley20 and argued at some length, but Lord Hatherley did not
decide the point. He said, however :21
"As to the difficulty from the possible remoteness of the time when
her intention can be carried into effect. I think the case of the Attor-
ney-General v. Bishop of Chester is a complete answer. In that case
the very point which arises here was suggested. There was a sum
of £I,ooo left for a good charitable purpose, namely, for the purpose
of establishing a bishop in the king's dominions in America. There
was no bishop in America. The sum, being only £I,ooo, was not
very likely in itself to be sufficient to establish a bishop. Nothing
could be more remote or less likely to happen within a reasonable
period, than the appropriation of that fund to that particular object.
But the Court did not direct any application of the fund according
to the cy pres doctrine; it would not allow the fund to be dealt with
immediately, but directed the fund to remain in hand for a time with
liberty to apply, because it was not known whether any bishop would
be established. But that the Court would continue to retain it for ever,
waiting until a bishop should be appointed, I think is a very doubtful
proposition."
His Lordship directed an inquiry whether or not the funds given
to the trustees for the purpose of aiding in erecting or endowing a
church at A, or any and what part thereof, could be so laid out and
employed.
In Chamberlayne v. Brockett,22 an inquiry was ordered as in Sinnett
v. Herbert. Lord Selborne said:
"When personal estate is once effectually given to charity it is taken
entirely out of the scope of the law of remoteness. . . . If the
fund should, either originally or in process of time, be or become greater
in amount than is necessary for that purpose, or if strict compliance
with the wishes and directions of the author of the trust should turn
out to be impracticable, this Court has power to apply the surplus,
or the whole (as the case may be) to such other purposes as it may
deem proper, upon what is called the cy pres principle."
(1857) 6 H. L. C. 338.
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In Re White's Trusts28 money was bequeathed to a company upon
trust "when a proper site can be obtained for that purpose" to "erect
or build almshouses." The money was paid into Court. Bacon, V. C.
said:
"I do not think the trustees are entitled to have the money until they
are in a position to come to the Court and say they have the land to
build upon and there must be a declaration to that effect."
Four years later it appeared that there was no reasonable prospect
of a site being obtained. Bacon, V. C. held that the doctrine of
cy pres could not be applied and that the legacy lapsed. It is difficult
to see why the legacy could not be applied as in Biscoe v. Jackson
2 4
as to which see Re Wilson.
25
It will have been seen that no certain conclusion can be drawn from
the cases. On the one hand the opinion of Lord Brougham and
apparently that of Lord Hatherley as well as the decision of Bacon,
V. C. are against what would appear to be Mr. Gray's view that
the principle of Attorney-General v. Chester depends upon the doctrine
of cy pres. On the other hand the cases do not seem sufficient to
establish Mr. Tyssen's elastic principle
26 which, if it were established
would be an anomalous exception to the rule in Cadell v. Palmer.
Lord Macnaghten's statement2 7 is not made clear by a perusal of the
cases upon which it may be supposed to be founded. Gifts for the
benefit of institutions which the donor hopes will be founded are not
uncommon, so that the point has more than an academic interest and
we may hope that one day Lord Macnaghten's cryptic words will be
construed authoritatively.
Meanwhile the practitioner who drafts a deed or will containing
such a gift should be careful to avoid the question either by confining
the time for the performance of the condition precedent-the founding
of the institution-within due limits or by expressing a general
charitable intention so that the cy pres doctrine may be applied.
(1886) 33 Ch. D. 449.
2, (1887) 35 Ch. D. 460.
[x913] I Ch. 314, 321.
" Supra, p. 47.
27 Ibid.
